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I Civil society and political union
Napole´on Bonaparte in defeat and exile dreamt of a future ‘association
europe´en’ with ‘one code, one court, one currency’.1
Was Napole´on’s speculation about the composition of the future
European Union one of his dangerous fantasies? Or was he correct to
believe that an association between the peoples of Europe would have
to be founded on and sustained by unified laws, a single system of
justice and a common currency? Are these apparently technical and
humdrum matters concerning the law and commerce the crucial
cement for binding together the nations and regions of Europe? Surely
these devices could not be as important to the future of the European
Union as the controversial topics debated in the press about consti-
tutions, institutional reform, a rapid response force, a common foreign
policy, the ‘democratic deficit’ and allegations of inefficiency and
corruption? Notwithstanding the lack of media interest in the ordinary
law of commerce and private relations, my thesis supports Napole´on’s
speculation: unified law, especially the laws governing commonplace
social and economic interactions between people, could make a vital
contribution to the future of the European Union. The general frame-
work of this argument can be expressed in a few general propositions.
(1) The European Union today is a political structure without a
community. It is a system of government for a continent, but this
territory is fragmented into many political and cultural
communities. Although nation states have pooled some of their
1 Compte de la Cases, Me´morial de Sainte-He´le`ne: Journal de la vie prive´e et des conversations de
l’empereur Napole´on a` Sainte-He´le`ne (London: Colburn and Bossange, 1823), quoted in
T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Heinemann, 2005) 715.
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sovereign powers in the institutions of the European Union, at the
level of everyday social interactions, national borders still present
serious obstacles to the formation of a single community – a
transnational civil society. Because the European Union does not rest
on a deeply integrated civil society, its political union often proves
fragile and dysfunctional, to the detriment of all.
(2) Any successful community or social order is rooted in the bonds
established through commonplace social interactions. In its basic
elements, a cohesive civil society evolves through working together
in productive activities, through exchanges of goods and services,
and by the establishment of private associations, family relations,
and all the different kinds of connections formed between ordinary
people in their daily lives. In modern societies, private law –
principally the laws of property, civil wrongs and contracts governing
relations between citizens – helps to channel these relationships, to
stabilise expectations and sometimes to correct disappointments and
betrayals.
(3) Once established, these relations of civil society form the bedrock
out of which political communities and shared identities arise.
Through the long-term repetition of these social interactions of civil
society, there emerges a belief on the part of the participants that
they are members of the same community and share a common
identity. Comprising a single people, an integrated community, they
require and accept political union – a single governance structure –
as well.
(4) The European Union, however, lacks such a dense set of connections
between peoples. It has failed to establish an integrated
transnational civil society out of which a common European identity
could be constructed. The protection of fundamental economic
freedoms by the European Treaties – the free movement of goods,
services, capital and labour – created elements of a European civil
society by giving citizens the right to engage in commerce across
borders. The additional regulatory interventions of the Single Market
initiative reduced further the barriers between national communities.
These measures removed some of the most conspicuous obstacles to
cross-border trade such as quotas, tariffs and prohibitions. But a more
comprehensive and inclusive transnational civil society requires more
extensive support.
(5) It is necessary to adopt common legal principles. By harmonising the
basic rules and institutions governing social interaction in civil
society, Europe can enable the evolution of a transnational civil
society community. In short, as Napole´on foresaw, the European
Union needs to work towards uniform laws: an integrated body of
legal principles to govern all the different kinds of relations
formed by citizens in a civil society.
2 hugh collins
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 11:58:04 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620010.003
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
These propositions comprise the central message of this book. At a time
when many have lost faith in the possibilities for greater solidarity
among the peoples of Europe, it is a message of hope. My project seeks
to sustain the aspiration expressed in the European Treaties for a closer
union of peoples in Europe in order to foster peace, prosperity and
respect for human rights.
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance,
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its
peoples.2
We should not permit conflicts of interest and the posturing of
nationalism to impede the search for permanent and more productive
unity.
Yet closer political union cannot be imposed on a reluctant populace
by the ruling political elites. In the name of democracy and account-
ability, grand constitutional schemes for a federal union will be inter-
rogated and found sorely lacking. Instead, greater unity or social
solidarity among the peoples of Europe must be sustained from below,
in the networks and interdependencies of social life. Shared legal
principles play an important role in supporting and channelling those
many ties that bind individuals to each other and to their communities
as a whole. Comprising an agreed statement of rights, obligations and
principles, the principles of private or civil law articulate a community
between individual citizens built on shared values of fairness and
respect for others. By acknowledging common rules for a transnational
civil society, the peoples of Europe can increase mutual trust and con-
fidence, which is an essential strand in the construction of stronger
bonds of solidarity. In the long run, rather than a political constitution,
these common rules brought together in a Civil Code are the essential
legal measure for the further evolution of Europe towards its aspiration
of an ever-closer union of its peoples and more effective pursuit of its
goals of peace, prosperity and respect for human rights.
2 Arts. 1A and 2(1) inserted into the Treaty on European Union by Art. 1 of the Treaty
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (the Lisbon Treaty) 13/12/2007, OJ C306, 17.12.2007.
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1 The constitution of everyday life
Why is the project for constructing a Civil Code so important to the
future of Europe? Are not solutions to othermuch-publicised problems –
from the perceived illegitimacy of the ‘democratic deficit’ in Europe’s
institutions to the waste and inefficiencies generated by subsidies and
quotas – more pressing and fundamental? Without denying the seri-
ousness of the challenges presented by these and many other familiar
sticks used to beat European institutions in the media, the case for
regarding a Civil Code as a central project for Europe depends on its
intimate connection to a broader aspiration. A Civil Code provides a
vital ingredient in constructing an economic and social constitution for
Europe. In the long run, in order to build greater solidarity among the
peoples of Europe, it is this social and economic constitution that must
be constructed.
This other constitution, what we shall call the ‘Economic Consti-
tution’,3 does not itself seek to alter the political arrangements for
sharing sovereignty between nation states, let alone impose a federal
sovereign state on Europe. Nor does this Economic Constitution impose
changes in political allegiances. Rather, an economic and social con-
stitution tries to establish a consensus of values regarding fairness and
social justice for a community. It provides a cement of social and eco-
nomic principles around which a community may build more per-
manent institutional structures. In Europe, this economic and social
constitution is sometimes called the European Social Model. But this
European Social Model remains unrealised: an aspiration that still
requires both detailed articulation and popular acceptance.
A Civil Code would supply part of the detailed articulation of an
economic and social constitution for Europe. These elementary rules
provide the foundation for civil society by guiding, channelling and
regulating social and economic interaction between individuals and
business organisations. Private law rules require performance of con-
tracts and respect for another’s interests, both personal and propri-
etary. The precisemeaning of the concept of private law differs between
3 M. E. Streit and W. Mussler, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Community –
“From Rome to Maastricht”’ in F. Snyder (ed.), Constitutional Dimensions of European
Economic Integration (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996) 109; W. Sauter, ‘The
Economic Constitution of the European Union’ (1998) 4 Columbia Journal of
European Law 27.
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legal systems.4 Some national legal systems, but not all, include family
and domestic relations within this category, though the central focus of
private law always concerns the economic and productive relations
between ordinary people. Together, these legal rules construct a
framework that ensures respect for personal dignity. At the same time
these rules articulate principles and values regarding fairness and
justice in social and economic relations with others. By combining
these elements, a Civil Code describes a web of standards that comprise
an economic and social constitution for society. This framework
enables individuals to interact, to create reciprocal bonds, to form
associations, to mix and to be inclusive. A Civil Code provides a con-
stitution on which all the networks of civil society can be constructed,
whether they concern economic exchange, social cooperation, or the
establishment of permanent associations.
A Civil Code also initiates a process that leads to popular acceptance
of this economic and social model. Every assertion of rights and obli-
gations arising under the private law rules of the code implies an
acceptance of its standards of justice and fairness. A complaint to a
fishmonger by a customer that her mackerel tasted stale and bitter
involves an acceptance of certain rules regarding sales of goods to
consumers; any acknowledgement or response to the complaint also
takes as a reference point those legal rules about contracts and their
quality standards. Through such dialogues, multiplied by the near-
infinite variety of interactions in civil society, the rules of private law
are tested, refined and ultimately accepted as the legitimate ground
rules. They become popularly accepted not by a momentary vote in a
ballot but rather through the repeated use of the rules to guide
behaviour and communications. The rules of civil law provide a shared
basis for communications that enable trust and mutual understanding
or, to paraphrase Damian Chalmers, an epistemic context for making
plans and getting on.5
A Civil Code created at a European transnational level of governance
achieves these goals across borders and cultures. It articulates the
4 G. Alpa, ‘European Community Resolutions and the Codification of “Private Law”’
(2000) 8 European Review of Private Law 321; for a more sceptical account that doubts any
stable meaning at all: D. Kennedy, ‘Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National
tradition in Private Law’, in M.W. Hesselink (ed.), The Politics of a European Code (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2006) 9.
5 D. Chalmers, ‘The Reconstitution of European Public Spheres’ (2003) 9 European Law
Journal 127.
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shared principles of fair dealing, just treatment and respect for the
interests of others that constitute vital ingredients in a European Social
Model. By relying on such a code of principles for guidance, citizens of
Europe can more easily establish trust and respect despite the differ-
ences of languages, cultures and nationalities. The same standards
would apply to a customer’s complaint about rotten fish whether made
in London, Athens, or Helsinki. A European Civil Code would provide
the necessary epistemic context for communications that help to esta-
blish a transnational civil society across borders and between cultures.
Such a constitution for everyday life is normally presupposed by the
constitution for the political institutions of the state. Historically, in
nation states, civil law provided the bedrock on which political associ-
ations and institutions were constructed. The evolving rules of owner-
ship, trade and personal status contained in private law described the
structure and scope of a community. Legal discourses weave their own
distinctive interpretations of the standards that should govern relations
in civil society and how those standards are connected to broader poli-
tical principles such as the protection of individual rights and the
obligations of membership of a community. Reliance on the rules
implies a common identity and membership in a community. Without
such an implicit common identity andmembership, it seems impossible
to imagine a single polity, an association of all the peoples of Europe.
The European Union needs this other constitution – this constitution
for everyday life – to further its economic objectives of promoting
peace, the well-being of its peoples, and to secure its values of respect
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, tolerance, justice and social
inclusion. Without a foundation in shared principles of civil law that
help to create a transnational civil society, endeavours to promote
better cooperation and coordination at a supranational level of gov-
ernance in Europe will surely remain frustrated.
The contemporary need for a European Civil Code arises precisely
because the political elites have proceeded in their construction of a
supra-national political constitution without having established in
advance sufficiently dense networks of civil society on which such a
constitution might rest. Like the constitution of a golf club, those poli-
tical rules about membership and governance make little sense unless
there is already an underlying network of individuals who play much
the same game with each other according to their shared conventions.
Similarly, for Europe, the interconnections of civil society need to
be dense and intricate before greater political integration can be
6 hugh collins
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contemplated. The central problem in Europe at present is not so much
one of reconnecting citizens to its political institutions – a connection
that was always thin in any case – but one of connecting citizens to
one another across national borders in the ordinary relations of civil
society.
Rather than having unity imposed from above, a Civil Code
empowers citizens to construct their own interpretation of how the
ever-closer union of peoples in Europe should evolve. By weaving the
fabric of a civil society that extends beyond the borders of nation states
through routine transactions of everyday life, such as buying goods,
travelling, renting accommodation and studying in schools and uni-
versities, citizens will become more receptive to regarding themselves
as having in part a shared polity or political society. They will become
more willing to accept a political and social identity of being in part
European, of sharing an identity in common with other Europeans, of
being part of a wider political community or polity, while at the same
time retaining their national and local cultures and allegiances.
The need for a European Civil Code derives from the need to facilitate
the construction of a European civil society, in which national boun-
daries appear less significant as social and economic ties cross these
artificial borders in associations and increasingly dense networks.6
That European civil society relies on mutual trust and respect, which
requires in turn a shared set of values and principles regarding fair
dealing, fair opportunities and effective protections from adversity. A
code of principles of private law articulates those values and ideals.
It provides the foundations on which greater solidarity between the
peoples of Europe can be built.
2 Mutual recognition
Yet is a European Civil Code really needed in order to achieve the aim of
a transnational civil society? Surely it is possible to establish economic
6 The term ‘European civil society’ is usually employed in a narrower sense in EU
documents to refer to representative non-governmental organisations with European-
wide membership, which can give voice to the concerns of citizens and business
interests: EC Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428, 11–18.
In this book my use of the concept employs the broader usage of social theory and
refers very broadly to any cross-border social and economic activity within Europe. For
clarifications, see: K. A. Armstrong, ‘Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union
and the White Paper on Governance’ (2002) 8(1) European Law Journal 102.
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and social ties across national boundaries without a uniform set of
transnational rules? For centuries, indeed, nation states have found a
route towards establishing thin threads of civil society across borders.
They have achieved support for international commerce and other
kinds of social relations without unifying civil laws. The method has
depended in modern societies on a broad idea of mutual recognition of
sovereignty.
Each nation state recognises the legal authority of the other states
within those other states’ borders. Further, each state recognises the
legal authority of other states where the other’s rules and jurisdiction
seem to have the closest connection to the events under consideration.
Under these rules of private international law (or conflict of laws), for
instance, a traffic accident that occurs between a British driver and a
French cyclist in France will be governed by French law, even if a claim
for compensation is brought before an English court. Moreover, courts in
the United Kingdom will respect the decisions of the French courts and
even enforce judgments for damages awarded by the French court
through domestic procedures. A special choice of law rule governs
contracts involving international trade: as a general principle, though
subject to exceptions, the parties to the contract are free to determine
both the law that should govern the transaction and the courts which
will have jurisdiction to adjudicate over any dispute. In order to pro-
mote mutual recognition and to avoid anomalies, the European Union
has been working towards the harmonisation of these rules of private
international law.7
This mutual recognition of the authority of other national legal sys-
tems goes a long way to make an international civil society possible. A
contract that is binding under its governing law will normally be
regarded as binding in whatever forum a dispute may be litigated. If a
person is married according to the rules of one legal system, that person
remains married while travelling the globe, even though the rules
governing the formation and the very concept of marriage diverge
considerably. Similarly, a contract may create a special type of propri-
etary interest under English law, and that interest is likely to be
7 Reg. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial
matters; Reg. 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II)
[2007] OJ L199/40; Reg. 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations
(Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.
8 hugh collins
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 11:58:04 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620010.003
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
respected even in a country that does not permit such a proprietary
right under its legal system, provided that the contract is governed by
English law.8 The combination of choice of law clauses and mutual
recognition by national courts enables international commerce to
flourish.
Mutual recognition always has limits. National sovereignty is pre-
served over many issues, so that the effectiveness of foreign legal
arrangements may not always be recognised on such grounds as public
order and moral standards. If the special type of proprietary interest
created by a contract runs contrary to fundamental standards of mor-
ality or public order, private international law does not require a
national court to respect the applicable law. A contract of slavery, for
instance, even though formed lawfully in the state of origin of the
parties, would not be respected by the tribunals of any European
country.
In pursuit of the goal of establishing a single market without trade
barriers, the European Union has employed variations on this tech-
nique of mutual recognition to challenge national barriers to the free
movement of goods and services. It has expanded the application of the
principle of mutual recognition from legal rules to all kinds of regula-
tions, administrative rules and market conventions. In relation to
goods, for instance, the strategy has been to require Member States to
respect the technical specifications for goods produced in other Mem-
ber States under a ‘country of origin’ principle.9 For example, a car
produced according to the technical requirements in the country of
assembly can be marketed throughout Europe without the need to
comply with different product specifications in other Member States.
Similarly, with regard to suppliers of professional services subject to
8 The position is not absolutely clear in relation to certain kinds of security rights:
J.W. Rutgers, International Reservation of Title Clauses (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 1999).
9 The ‘country of origin’ principle is not found in modern private international law
rules, so there is a debate whether such EUmeasures conflict with or improve upon the
underlying principles: H. Heiss and N. Downes, ‘Non-Optional Elements in an Optional
European Contract Law: Reflections from a Private International Law Perspective’
(2005) 13 European Review of Private Law 693; A.M. Lopez-Rodriguez, ‘The Rome
Convention of 1980 and its Revision at the Crossroads of the European Contract Law
Project’ (2004) 12 European Review of Private Law 167; R. Michaels, ‘EU Law as Private
International Law?’ Discussion Paper 5/2006 (Bremen: ZERP, 2006). But from the
perspective adopted here, these distinctions are not as important as the contrast
between, on the one hand, harmonised laws and, on the other, mutual recognition and
respect for the laws, regulations and standards of other nation states, which is the
underlying principle of any private international law system.
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regulatory regimes involving formal qualifications, the principle of
mutual recognition seeks to enable professionals qualified in their
home state to offer their services in a state where they do not satisfy the
local regulatory conditions.10 The country of origin principle applies
also to the regulation of the provider of a service through electronic
means: the regulations of the home country apply, even where the
service is received in another country, though Member States are
required to comply with common standards.11 Again, this expansive
use of the principle of mutual recognition as a technique for market
integration encounters limits when Member States perceive that
important issues of public order and safety are at stake.
Mutual recognition has been the traditional route for building
international connections between civil societies. It provides the
necessary assurance of legal support for international business trans-
actions. Mutual recognition in all its guises appears to provide a tried
and tested way of enabling international cooperation between civil
societies, without the need for the adoption of uniform transnational
laws. A first question that must be confronted here, therefore, is
whether the project of developing a European Civil Code is necessary.
Assuming that Europe does require projects that will lead towards the
construction of transnational civil society, why will mutual recognition
not provide an adequate and comprehensive alternative for building a
transnational civil society in Europe? Why is greater harmonisation of
the law necessary, when mutual recognition can enable transnational
arrangements to be made and disputes to be settled?
3 Social dumping
Although mutual recognition facilitates transnational civil society, it
also invites the risk of ‘social dumping’. It threatens to undercut the
standards that uphold public policy concerns. These concerns may
include, for instance, labour standards, consumer safety rules, envi-
ronmental protection measures and prohibitions against unfair com-
petitive practices. With respect to technical standards there is a risk,
for example, that products which conform to the health and safety
10 E.g. Dir. 2005/36, OJ 2005, L255/22 on the recognition of professional qualifications.
11 Dir. 2000/31, OJ L178, 17 July 2000, p. 1 on certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce; M. Hellner, ‘The Country of Origin
Principle in the E-Commerce Directive – A Conflict with Conflict of Law?’ (2004) 12
European Review of Private Law 193.
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standards of one country will be exported to another which requires
compliance with more demanding regulatory standards. If mutual
recognition permits such imports, the local regulations are effectively
subverted. Consumers who purchase foreign products that merely
conform to inferior technical standards may be disappointed by the
shoddy or even unsafe imported goods they purchase. Similarly, if an
employer in one country sends workers to another while retaining the
permitted terms and conditions of employment of the country of ori-
gin, there is a risk that these workers posted abroad will receive rates of
pay that fall below the host country’s conventional standards and even
below its mandatory rules concerning minimum wages. More gener-
ally, the power to choose the governing civil law of contracts encour-
ages businesses to seek legal systems that favour their interests by, for
instance, minimising the rights of consumers. In short, the principle
of mutual recognition threatens to subvert all kinds of protective
standards.
Given this pressure from business organisations to operate in the
least restrictive regulatory environment, mutual recognition, especially
in the strands of country of origin and free choice of law governing
contracts, may provoke a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’. It is predicted
that nation states will reduce the regulatory burden under which
businesses are required to operate in order to attract inward capital
investment.12 A manufacturer of electrical products, for instance, is
likely to locate its plant in a country with low technical standards, to
which it is inexpensive to conform, and low employment law standards
that reduce the cost of labour to the business. In order to attract such a
business to its territory, with the ensuing benefits of employment and
wealth to be distributed around the community, any country will be
tempted to compete for the investment by reducing their domestic
regulatory burden. If every state joins this competition to attract capital
investment by diminishing social and labour standards, a downward
spiral of social protection seems inevitable. On this model, therefore,
mutual recognition provokes the response of deregulation and the
weakening of social protection.
Although this theoretical model of regulatory competition seems to
exaggerate the actual risks in practice, the European Union has adopted
measures designed to counter the most obvious dangers of social
12 J. P. Trachtman, ‘International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and
Jurisdiction’ (1993) 34 Harvard International Law Journal 47.
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dumping and deregulation. It permits national restrictions on imports
where these controls can be justified by reference to a legitimate goal of
public policy under a test of proportionality: the restriction on imports
must be an appropriate and necessary control in order to give effect to
the legitimate public policy concern.13 With respect to the legal rights
of consumers and employees, businesses are not permitted to exercise a
choice of law in the contract which deprives consumers and employees
of their rights according to their ordinary place of residence.14 In addi-
tion, workers who are posted to a foreign country must receive basic
terms and conditions that conform to those enjoyed by workers in the
host country.15 These protections against social dumping ensure that
the greatest risks of abuse are avoided.
Nevertheless, social dumping is an inherent risk of any scheme of
mutual recognition. The risk can only be completely avoided by reject-
ing the principle of mutual recognition in all its guises altogether.16 In
other words, uniform transnational laws solve the problem of social
dumping, but only at the expense of abandoning mutual recognition
and the diversity of laws. Although the European Union has so far
confined uniform laws to regulatory initiatives that ostensibly pursue
specific policy objectives, such as worker and consumer protection, the
boundary between regulation and general contract law rules cannot be
drawn sharply. Taking the problem of social dumping seriously
requires the harmonisation of an ever-larger body of laws, edging ever
closer towards comprehensive supranational laws, with the distant
end point on the horizon of a European Civil Code. Mutual recognition
does not, therefore, provide a sustainable long-term alternative to full
harmonisation of laws.
4 Post-nationalism
An abandonment of the principle of mutual recognition in all its guises
forces us to confront the deepest andmost controversial issue provoked
by calls for comprehensive principles of European law to regulate civil
13 EC Treaty Arts. 28 and 30, discussed below in chapter II.
14 Reg. 593/2008 ‘Rome I’, above n 7.
15 Dir. 96/71 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of
services [1996] OJ L18/1.
16 For the contrary view that choice of law can be reformulated better to serve the public
interest: H. Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets:
A Matter of Political Economy’ (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 383.
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society. Mutual recognition affirms the need to respect the diversity and
integrity of nations. The idea that each national legal system should
respect the rules of others where they aremore closely connected to the
issue or dispute exhibits the quality of the comity of nations. Each
nation respects the sovereignty of others over their territories and their
civil societies. Private international law functions in parallel to public
international law: the latter requires mutual recognition of the sover-
eignty of states; the former requires mutual recognition of the integrity
of the distinct civil societies protected by those states. A rejection of
mutual recognition seems to entail both a move towards supranational
organisations between states and a diminished respect for diversity in
the cultures of civil society.
In Europe, it is still the case that national communities remain the
principal focus for political life and group identity. The identity of
individuals by reference to their holding a particular nationality is
powerfully linked to the view that the nation state is unique in pos-
sessing political sovereignty. Although a nation state may agree in
treaties to share its sovereignty with other states for a common pur-
pose, that practice does not affect the view that the ultimate power and
authority still resides with the nation state. For example, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created in 1945 as an inter-
national organisation, one to which its member states could join or
leave according to their sovereign wishes. Although NATO performs the
bulk of the vital function of defence for its members, this sharing of
sovereignty did not create a supranational sovereign organisation.
NATO is not an institution which is permanently vested with the
authority to control and direct the defence policies of all its members.
According to the policies of national governments, states may join,
leave and even form rival associations for the purpose of defence, and
NATO has no legitimate authority to prevent them from doing so.
The European Community commenced as a similar kind of non-
sovereign international organisation. Its tasks were limited to the per-
formance of particular functions. Following inaugural measures to
integrate the production of steel,17 the Common Market comprised an
international treaty to create a single market without customs barriers
and other impediments to competition between businesses.18 Even as
17 European Coal and Steel Community, Treaty of Paris 1951, which expired after fifty
years on 23 July 2002.
18 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Treaty of Rome 1957.
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the powers or competences of the European Community were subse-
quently expanded to encompass aspects of social policy, foreign rela-
tions and justice, the framework of an international organisation,
without sovereign power, was preserved. The European Community
performed functions on behalf of its Member States in a wide range of
fields, but was not regarded as amounting to a supranational or federal
body, which itself could exercise its sovereignty independently. In this
sense, the European Community retained fidelity to the principle of
mutual recognition: each state remained independent in principle,
even though it had agreed in treaties to share its sovereignty over
particular governmental functions.
As a consequence, the institutions of the European Community
remained technocratic in outlook.19 In particular, the European Com-
mission (the executive body) was charged under the international
treaties with the performance of certain functions as an agent of the
collective will of the Member States. Its job was to fulfil its roles allo-
cated by the international treaties, such as policing observance of rules
against obstructions to cross-border trade, eliminating inference with
competition and subsidising agricultural production. The actions of the
Commission always had to be justified by reference to the logic of the
allocated functional goals or competences such as market integration
or a common agricultural policy. The mode of operation was limited to
the types of regulatory powers established by the treaties. In practice,
the Commission proposed regulatory measures that it believed would
promote its functions. The Member States in the Council of Ministers
could approve or reject the proposals. The original voting system con-
ferred a veto power on Member States with respect to most areas of the
competence of the European Community. Later on, commencing with
the Single European Act of 1986, a majority voting system with detailed
rules governing weighted votes according to the population size of a
country was adopted for measures connected with market integration.
Even so, in most fields of governance, Member States retain powers to
veto European initiatives.
This technocratic structure of the European Union was hardly likely
to appeal to the hearts and minds of the peoples of Europe. The insti-
tutions could be lambasted for their democratic deficit. The policies
could be criticised for a narrow concentration on the integration of the
19 W. Wallace, ‘Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe, 1945–93’, in
P. Gowan, and P. Anderson (eds.), The Question of Europe (London: Verso, 1997) 21.
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economic market, with too little attention being paid to social issues,
such as protection of weaker groups. Progressive changes introduced by
the Treaties attempted to respond to these criticisms of the European
Community both by expanding the role of the European Parliament in
the formulation of laws and by extending the range of functions of the
Community.
As the governmental competences of the Community expanded,
however, the line between a functional international organisation and
a supranational sovereign entity began to be blurred. This sense that the
European Community had embarked on a route towards becoming a
supranational sovereign entity was only heightened by its renaming as
the European Union,20 the introduction of the notion of European
citizenship alongside national citizenship21 and the declaration at Nice
in 2000 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.22
The most dramatic stage in this blurring of the boundary between a
functional pooling of national sovereignty and a supranational sover-
eign entity was the (proposed) Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe.23 Although this Constitutional Treaty was almost entirely a
consolidating law that brought together in one text the various existing
treaties and their amendments together with the Nice Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, at a symbolic level, particularly in the use of the word
‘Constitution’, it seemed to represent an acknowledgement of the
arrival of a supranational entity. It spelt out the demise of mutual rec-
ognition. The word ‘Constitution’ implied that somehow the European
Union could now act as a supranational governmental organisation
without always being subject to national sovereign vetoes and controls.
Article I–8 of the proposed Constitutional Treaty adopted all the con-
ventional symbols of a sovereign entity: a flag, an anthem, a motto
(‘United in diversity’), a currency and a ‘Europe day’.
When citizens were asked to vote in referenda on the proposed
Constitutional Treaty, or national parliaments were asked to ratify it,
they could vote against the treaty and its implied creation of a supra-
national governmental entity on the basis of any and all fears about
what it might do, no matter how unlikely and contradictory those
fears might be. It was as plausible for a Frenchman to vote against the
proposed Constitutional Treaty on the ground that it might lead to a
20 Treaty on European Union, 7/2/1992 [1992] OJ C191.
21 Art. 17 EC, created by the Treaty on European Union 1992.
22 2000/C 364/01. 23 CIG 87/2/04 Rev. 2, Brussels, 29 October 2004.
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dismantling of social protections in favour of a more laissez-faire market
economy as it was for the British electorate to be minded to reject it on
the ground that it might lead to the creation of an excessively rigid and
paternalistic economic order. Although the proposed Constitutional
Treaty made scarcely any changes to the existing treaties that might
have affected Europe’s philosophy about market regulation and social
protection, that fact was beside the point.24
Whatever the political elites might maintain to the contrary, the real
issue in the referenda and debates about the proposed Constitution was
whether citizens were ready to accept a new stage in the development
of post-nationalism in Europe. This step would involve the creation of a
supranational governance institution with qualities that attributed
inherent sovereignty to it. It was expected that national governments,
though remaining highly significant, would share rather than merely
delegate governance functions with the European Union. When they
had the opportunity to speak or vote, the response to the proposed
Constitutional Treaty from the peoples of Europe was often loudly
negative. Many were reluctant to accept that the treaties had donemore
and should do more than establish institutional arrangements between
nation states for the performance of limited and defined functions.
Despite its declarations of citizenship and respect for fundamental
rights, many people in Europe did not accept that the European Union
had yet established a ‘social contract’ or community between all the
citizens of those states.25 Even those people who were broadly sympa-
thetic to the project of the European Union did not regard themselves as
associating already as citizens in a pan-European civil society. In the
absence of that unity or solidarity in a transnational civil society, that
popular sense of a post-nationalist political community, no foundation
24 For a detailed analysis of the changes proposed in the Constitution: J.-C. Piris, The
Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
25 See for suggestions that such a ‘social contract’ or association of civil society must be
presupposed by a European constitution: J. H.H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a
Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and Ethos in the German Maastrict
Decision’, in P. Gowan, and P. Anderson (eds.), The Question of Europe (London: Verso,
1997) 265, 288: ‘The Treaties on this reading would have to be seen not only as an
agreement among states (a Union of States) but as a “social contract” among the
nationals of those states – ratified in accordance with the constitutional requirements
in all member states – that they will in the areas covered by the treaty regard
themselves as associating as citizens in this civic society. We can go even further. In
this polity, and to this demos, one cardinal value is precisely that there will not be a
drive towards, or an acceptance of, an over-arching organic–cultural national identity
displacing those of the member states.’
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could be found on which to base even a tentative allocation of partial
sovereignty to a supranational entity.
Following the demise of the proposed Constitutional Treaty after
negative referenda in France and the Netherlands, the Lisbon inter-
governmental conference of political leaders agreed in 2007 a watered-
down version popularly known as the Lisbon Reform Treaty.26 Although
this revised Treaty repeats some plans for detailed changes to the
functioning of the institutions of the European Union, its tone is very
different. It stresses that the powers of the European Union are only
those conferred by the Member States and that they retain sovereignty
over everything else.27 Although the Lisbon Treaty reaffirms that the
Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights shall have the same legal value as
the Treaties, it hastens to add that this recognition of the importance of
human and social rights does not extend the competences of the
European Union at all.28 There is no more talk about the trappings of
sovereignty such as flags, anthems and a special day.
The project to impose supranational governmental institutions from
above seems moribund for the time being. The most that the political
elites can achieve at present is some tinkering with institutions and
marginal expansion of competences. Even these modest measures are
26 Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (the Lisbon Treaty) 13/12/2007, OJ C306, 17.12.2007.
27 Art. 1.6, containing new Arts. 3a and 3b for the Treaty on European Union. Art. 3b
states:
1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The
use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality.
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the
Treaties remain with the Member States.
3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at
central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.
28 Art. 1.8, containing a new Art. 6 for the Treaty on European Union with regard to
fundamental rights. The governments of the United Kingdom and Poland insisted on a
protocol that purports to clarify the limited legal implications of this measure by
denying that it creates any directly effective rights. However, the European Court of
Justice will interpret EU laws in accordance with the Nice Charter and its decisions
will be binding on all Member States, so the new Art. 6 will have indirect effects on
European law applicable in the United Kingdom See chapter IX below.
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plagued by national opt-outs and unprincipled and opaque comprom-
ises. To the immense pleasure of its enemies and sceptics, the European
Union has the usual trappings of a failed state: a technocratic apparatus
that lacks both popular legitimacy and functional effectiveness in its
pursuit of policy goals.
5 Networks of transnational civil society
How can the project of the European Union proceed any further? In my
view, the key lies not in high politics but in civil society. To persuade
citizens of different nationalities that the European project should be
supported further in the direction of a supranational form of govern-
ance, a denser community formed of shared interests and cooperative
associations needs to be established. Europeans need to feel that being
European is an important part of their identity, that they are members
of a society that partially transcends historic national borders.
One way to bring forward such a process of fostering a European
identity is to facilitate and promote all kinds of private agreements that
traverse national boundaries. Perhaps the humble package holiday has
done more than anything else to facilitate such cross-border links.
Although these holidaymakers may remain slightly cocooned in the
plastic shell of a hotel by the beach, most venture outside and, despite
language barriers, discover that the alien culture can quickly become
familiar and welcoming. No doubt many other consumer transactions
with a cross-border element help to establish denser links between
separate communities. Shopping, eating in restaurants, riding on pub-
lic transport in foreign cities begin to establish relations based upon
stable expectations shared by consumers and business. Long-term
family arrangements between partners of different nationalities also
diminish the significance and consciousness of national barriers.
Of greater importance to this process of building a transnational civil
society will be more permanent associations between groups who share
common interests and concerns. Such associations might link together
professionals such as doctors and lawyers in transnational organisations,
which share knowledge but also establish normative standards for
training, professional conduct and research.29 Similarly, businesses in
29 G. Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centred Constitutional
Theory?’, in C. Joerges, I.-J. Sand and G. Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and
Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 3.
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particular economic sectors can establish common technical standards
regarding product quality, safety and environmental protection. These
businesses may also establish common standards for their transactions
among themselves along supply chains through standard form contracts.
Such business associations might comprise an international clearing
system among banks that establishes rules governing transfers of funds
or rules governing the creation and transmission of other kinds of
intangible financial products. For example, the International Chamber of
Commerce provides standard rules for international payment transfers
for the supply of goods under its Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits. Another example may be an integrated trans-
national supply chain that by means of computerised inventory control
and ordering ensures the steady supply of fresh products to the consumer
in a supermarket in another country. As well as business associations,
transnational civil society can be constructed through networks and
associations of professionals, groups with shared scientific concerns and
linksbetween institutions suchasuniversities andresearchgroups.Within
such transnational associations, through dialogue, agreement, commu-
nication networks and observance of conventional practice, we can dis-
cern the evolution of shared rules of economic and social governance.
These business associations, social networks, technical standards
bodies and scientific associations, together with long-term family
relations and more transient transactions such as the package holiday,
are the building blocks of a transnational civil society in Europe. They
open up the possibilities for transnational networks between citizens to
become denser and form part of the routines of everyday life. These
routines derive ultimately from mutual reliance and trust, but then
themselves reinforce social solidarity, a sense of belonging to and
owing loyalty towards a European community.
Although the basic principles of mutual recognition facilitate the
emergence of such transnational networks of civil society, greater
support can be provided by common principles and standards that
consolidate and clarify mutual expectations in transnational civil
society. For example, although each country may respect and recognise
the qualifications of lawyers in other countries,30 the differences in
30 Mutual recognition for migrating lawyers, with many reservations, is based on
Dir. 77/249 on lawyers’ services [1977] OJ L78/17, Dir. 98/5 on lawyers’ establishment
[1998] OJ L77/36 and Dir. 2005/36 on the recognition of professional qualifications [2005]
OJ L255/22.
civil society and political union 19
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 11:58:04 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620010.003
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
training, knowledge and competences of lawyers between Member
States may well discourage the acceptance of foreign professionals in
practice and prevent the formation of transnational associations and
mutual dealings. Where common standards are adopted, however, even
if they merely state minimum requirements for qualifications and
practical experience, it is easier to overcome these reservations and
concerns.
Similar arguments apply to the most basic kinds of links in trans-
national civil society, such as a cross-border sale of goods. Where con-
sumers can be reasonably confident that the protections afforded by the
rules of every Member State are adequate because they conform to
commonminimum standards, they will be more willing to take the risk
of shopping abroad. Common rules can provide safety standards, a right
to repair or replacement and compensation for losses and disappoint-
ment. Although consumers may still act more circumspectly when
purchasing goods and services in an unfamiliar foreign context, the
assurance of common standards will diminish these psychological
barriers to cross-border trade.
It is probable that where urgent business needs require standardised
rules regarding transnational dealings, some kind of institutional
mechanism for the creation of the standards will be constructed by
private actors. The history of international commerce reveals consi-
derable ingenuity exercised by banks and merchants in constructing
standardised customs and practices, such as bills of exchange, docu-
mentary credits and technical specifications for products. Although
these autonomous private rule systems serve important commercial
functions well, they do not contribute strongly to the building of a
transnational civil society in the sense of helping to forge a common
post-national identity. In their creation, these transnational trade rules
and institutions lack the transparency and legitimacy conferred by a
democratic legislative process.31 As a consequence, they remain weak
instruments for building a popular sense of shared identity across
borders. Indeed, many of these international trade institutions may be
regarded with suspicion as devices for facilitating global markets that
31 These challenges of global governance have, of course, been explored in an
extensive literature, of which examples from a legal and private law perspective are:
G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth Gower, 1997);
O. Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and
Environment Conflict (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); Joerges, Sand and Teubner,
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism above n. 29.
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function outside the controls of nation states. In which case, such
institutions may provoke a fruitless backlash against transnational civil
society – the ‘anti-globalisation’ movements – and a reversion to calls
for an unrealistic and impractical national autonomy. What is required
instead are methods for ensuring that transnational private organisa-
tions which can impose effective normative systems comply with pro-
cedural and substantive standards such as those contained in the Nice
Charter, which have been endorsed by representative political insti-
tutions. This argument suggests that transnational political institutions
such as the European Union need both to assist and to regulate inter-
national commercial institutions in order to ensure the transparency
and legitimacy of their operations. In particular, transnational political
institutions must have the space and opportunity to ensure that the
standards developed by private commercial organisations conform to
the basic principles of social justice in a market economy that have
been described here as an Economic Constitution.
6 Towards a European Civil Code
The case for enlarging the scope of common principles of private law,
leading eventually to a European Civil Code, depends ultimately on the
contribution of such rules to the construction of transnational civil
society. My argument has been that without assistance and shaping by
transnational political institutions, such as the European Union, the
commercial arrangements, customs and rules constructed by private
organisations will not establish the necessary sense of post-national
identity. The lex mercatoria, as these international commercial standards
and practices are often labelled, may have the practical effectiveness of
law, but it lacks the legitimacy and transparency in its processes of
creation, which are necessary for laws to provide the basis for a political
identity. A combination of pluralism in the development of standards
for a transnational civil society, thereby taking advantage of business
and technical expertise, with a requirement for endorsement by politi-
cal authorities and conformity to substantive standards such as social
and economic rights, seems the most likely formula to achieve a
properly functioning and accepted transnational civil society.
In Europe, in order to facilitate a transnational civil society that can
form the basis for a post-national political identity, it is probably not
essential to devise a comprehensive civil code that provides common
rules for every kind of social and economic association or transaction.
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The common rules could focus, at least initially, on supporting what are
perceived to be the key building blocks that will sustain and promote
networks and associations in transnational civil society. Some of these
elementary building blocks are likely to be discovered in the laws
governing contracts, compensation for damage and injury, protection
of property rights (especially intangible proprietary interests such as
copyright and financial instruments) and business associations. These
ingredients may represent the priorities in a programme for building
transnational social solidarity, but in principle there should be no
restriction on the scope for agreeing common rules for any kinds of
transactions and arrangements in civil society.
If Europe is to progress further in its aims of securing peace and
prosperity for its citizens, for the time being it should concentrate not
on building controversial supranational sovereign institutions, but
rather on helping to support and sustain transnational networks of civil
society. In the original legal framework for the European Economic
Community, it was assumed that integration of communities would be
achieved through a combination of the dismantling of regulatory bar-
riers and of the application of mutual recognition principles between
broadly similar systems of private law.32 The principle of mutual rec-
ognition is often inadequate for this purpose, because it fails to ensure
minimum standards of social protection and provide a reliable basis for
mutual trust and confidence. Common rules and principles of private
law will provide a superior basis for constructing a transnational civil
society. In nation states those common rules have been provided by
civil codes that provide support for the basic institutions and arrange-
ments of civil society, such as the enforcement of contracts, compen-
sation for damage and the structure of business associations. Similarly,
the European Union needs to develop equivalent rules and institutional
arrangements. In short, Europe needs to work towards a Civil Code.
This argument for a project for a European Civil Code is not closely
connected to a policy of promoting the smooth functioning of the
internal market throughout Europe. Uniform laws may reduce certain
obstacles to trade presented by diversity in national contract laws. Yet
that market integration rationale does not describe the principal rea-
sons given here for Europe’s need for common rules and principles of
32 P.-C. Mu¨ller-Graff, ‘Common Private Law in the European Community’, in B. de
Witte and C. Firder (eds.), The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1992) 239.
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private law. Instead, the project for working towards a civil code pro-
vides an opportunity to address central political needs in Europe. First,
it offers the possibility of giving substance to an Economic Consti-
tution, of providing some detail for a European Social Model that can be
promoted as an ideal of justice to which we all aspire. Second, the
acceptance of common rules and principles through social practice will
provide substance to and support for a conception of a transnational
civil society, which in turn can provide the foundation for a post-
national identity, a European polity, for which supranational insti-
tutions of governance are required. In combination, these two strands
will contribute to restoring confidence and respect on the part of its
citizens to the European supranational political structure. Matching the
origins in European integration inmarket building rather than political
constitution building, the development of a Civil Code, perhaps com-
mencing with contract law or merely consumer contracts, would serve
as the next institutional step in creating a system of governance that
reinforces the complex aims enshrined in the treaties of both ever-
closer unity while respecting the sovereignty of nation states.
7 Objections, refutations and qualifications
Yet that ambitious agenda for a European Civil Code omits consider-
ation of the many complexities, difficulties and subtleties of the pro-
posals outlined here. The remaining chapters address many of the
problems that will inevitably arise and the controversies that will ensue
in pursuing the project for a European Civil Code. The nature of some of
the fundamental problems, and how they will be addressed, will be
briefly indicated here.
Many of the problems examined in subsequent chapters arise from
the simple point that Europe has a long history and that inevitably we
have to proceed fromwhere we are now rather than from a blank sheet.
One crucial constraint, examined in chapter II, concerns the evolution
of the institutions and competences of the European Union so far.
Having commenced its life as an international organisation with
limited functional competences, its technocratic agenda has severely
limited its initiatives and appreciation of the issues raised by the project
for building a transnational civil society. In particular, the legislation of
the European Union in civil matters is deeply unsatisfactory in
numerous respects, as well as being ill equipped to perform its desig-
nated functions. It provides a poor starting-point for trying to build
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institutions and networks of a transnational civil society. Even so, this
existing body of laws, including the judicial interpretations of the
legislation and treaties, probably cannot easily be dismantled or
replaced.
In the light of the limited powers conferred by the European treaties,
chapter III observes how the institutions of the European Union have
approached the question of the need for a European Civil Code through
a distorted and unsatisfactory perspective. This chapter argues that
although recent proposals of the Commission may be going in broadly
the right direction, these initiatives are motivated, at least ostensibly,
by the wrong reasons. The Commission promotes projects leading
towards a Civil Code as part of its internal market agenda. As a para-
doxical consequence of its limited competence, however, the Commis-
sion promotes this work while denying that a Civil Code is its objective.
A better justification for these projects, it is argued here, lies in the
quest for an Economic Constitution and a post-national identity. As a
consequence of this misconception regarding the aim of progressing
towards uniform private law, the current plans and political process in
Europe are deeply flawed, and the likely outcome of the technocratic
deliberations is unlikely to prove fit for any significant and worthwhile
purpose.
Developing that argument in chapter IV, we explore what is meant
here by an Economic Constitution and consider further the contribu-
tion that a Civil Code might make to the development of a European
Social Model. We examine how far the European Union has already
progressed in establishing the foundations for a Civil Code that
expresses a social model through its existing legislation.
Nation states have a longer history than the European Union. They
possess sophisticated systems of private law already, and in many cases
have done so for several centuries. Although there are family resem-
blances between national private law systems, with some being close
relatives, the diversity of the systems represents a major problem for
the construction of a European Civil Code. As well as diversity arising
from the legal rules being expressed in different languages and con-
cepts, there are major differences in form and substance. Whereas most
European states have a codified system of law, judge-made common law
persists in the United Kingdom, Eire and other smaller Member States.
Differences in substance prove harder to detect, because the private
law rules of every country endorse a version of a market economy
that respects private property and freedom of contract. Yet detailed
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comparative law studies constantly reveal divergences in values
expressed by national laws, such as how much protection to afford a
weaker party to a contract and how best to provide that protection.
These legal rules have co-evolved with the social practices and con-
ventions of their local communities and reflect those differences: by
convention a consumer has the right to taste a melon in Spain before
purchase, but in France and England a consumermust take the risk that
the melon will not be ripe or sweet. European countries lack identical
private law rules and this national diversity represents an important
tradition that needs to be accommodated by supranational governance
arrangements. Without powerful incentives, the English will not
relinquish the common law, nor the French the Code Napole´on, nor the
Germans the BGB, etc.
Chapter V addresses the challenge presented by the need to respect
cultural diversity to any project for harmonising laws. The central
question is how private law can be used to build solidarity between the
peoples of Europe while respecting and embracing the value of cultural
diversity. The principal answer to this dilemma, it is argued, lies in
the construction of a code of principles rather than detailed rules.
Chapter VI addresses in particular the challenges presented to a project
for a European Civil Code by the existing marked diversity in the pri-
vate law systems of the different Member States. Given significant dis-
parities in the values and techniques of national private law systems,
is the aspiration towards harmonisation either practicable or desirable
in view of the possible disintegrative effects on national laws?
As well as confronting these problems arising from the historical
legacy, any project for a European Civil Code needs to recognise that the
governance arrangements in the European Union will inevitably
diverge from the institutional structures established in national legal
systems. It should be assumed, for instance, that it will be impracticable
aswell as probably undesirable to restructure civil courts into a European
federal system with a transnational hierarchy of appeal courts. Civil
justice must therefore comprise multi-level arrangements in which
national courts will handle the bulk of the disputes arising in civil
society, though with occasional guidance on difficult questions of
interpretation from the European Court of Justice. As a consequence of
this multi-level system of adjudication, even with a European Civil
Code, the considerable autonomy of national courts will preclude the
emergence of uniform private law throughout Europe. National courts
will interpret the common rules and principles in divergent ways,
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according to their traditions of legal reasoning, and address issues
through different legal processes. Chapter VII examines the ramifica-
tions of conceiving of a multi-level private law system in Europe.
The problem then to be addressed in chapter VIII is how to cope with
continuing diversity of private law in this multi-level system of gov-
ernance. Elimination or suppression of diversity, it will be argued, is, in
principle, undesirable. On the contrary, we need to find the virtue in
the divergence of national laws of the opportunity for mutual learning
and discovery. At the same time, however, it is possible to create
institutions that will encourage and facilitate convergence between
national private law systems. It is in this context of promoting con-
vergence that proposals are advanced both for a European Private Law
Institute and for autonomous agreements that fix the terms of trans-
actions for the promotion of cross-border trade.
As well as providing this opportunity for mutual learning and dis-
covery, more fundamentally a European Civil Code provides the
opportunity to reconsider and enact a new statement of the funda-
mental principles governing civil society – the core of the Economic
Constitution. Much of the private law extant in Europe was originally
devised more than a century ago, at a time when political ideologies
tended to prize highly values such as the sanctity of private property
and contracts. The national civil codes expressed the ground rules for
a liberal society, rules which unleashed the forces of a free market
economy. In the twentieth century, these laws were much revised to
reflect modern values, such as the protection of weaker parties to
contracts including consumers and workers, or the use of insurance
and tort law to redistribute the costs of accidents that cause personal
injury. Instead of talking about caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) as
in the past, today we speak of ensuring that consumers receive good-
quality goods that meet their expectations in return for a fair com-
petitive price. As a result of a succession of legislative and judicial
amendments, together with doctrinal evolution, civil codes in Europe
today try to endorse a more complex set of values than their liberal
predecessors. The law seeks to balance personal freedom or autonomy
against values such as fairness and social solidarity. Courts think today
about issues in private law in ways that require them to address com-
plex policy questions through techniques such as economic analysis
and reflections on the material scope of social and political rights. In
making these adjustments to modern values, private law has lost some
of its coherence and integrity in all national legal systems.
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Chapter IX concludes by observing that the development of a
European Civil Code provides an opportunity for a more systematic
approach towards the construction of private law rules that would
address the new complex values that are engaged in adjudication of
disputes in civil society. The patches of European private law so far
enacted have compelled each national legal system to question its own
settled practices and doctrinal conceptions. But these are merely frag-
ments of a potentially much broader programme for a reconsideration
of an expression of social justice in civil society. The development of a
European Civil Code would above all present the opportunity for
European citizens to try to express and endorse, in the words of the
Lisbon Treaty, a conception of a ‘social market economy’ and ‘social
justice and protection’:
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stabi-
lity, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment
and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the
quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological
advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall pro-
mote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, soli-
darity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.33
Such a conception of a social market economy would fulfil the promise
of Europe to achieve both the material advantages of a competitive
internal market and at the same time to ensure a fair and socially
inclusive conception of distributive justice through the protection of
social and economic rights. These rules and principles would constrain
and steer the market and other dimensions of civil society for the
purpose of constituting and encouraging a particular and distinctive
economic and social system in Europe. Chapter IX notes that a civil code
is the first, crucial step, towards a balanced and complete Economic
Constitution for Europe, the beginning of the realisation of a European
Social Model.
33 Lisbon Treaty, Art. 1.3, creating a new Art. 2.3 in the Treaty on European Union,
13/12/2007, OJ C306, 17.12.2007; the notion of a social market economy is open to a
wide variety of interpretations, which vary in national political discourse from rather
liberal markets to those more closely regulated for welfare purposes: A. Somma,
‘Exporting Economic Democracy – Social Justice and Private Law from the Point of
View of Non-European Countries’, in T. Wilhelmsson, E. Paunio and A. Pohjolainen
(eds.), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
2007) 201, 204.
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